

## Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 175025

42

ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ADP-00 SSO-00 /016 R

DRAFTED BY S/S-O: WORREL

9/1/73

APPROVED BY S/S-O: WRIGHT

DESIRED DISTRIBUTION

S/S ONLY

----- 118814

O 011306Z SEP 73

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO JCS/SECDEF IMMEDIATE

CIA IMMEDIATE

WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 175025

EXDIS-DOD HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE FOR SECDEF

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS; PFOR

SUBJECT: MORNING SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT REPORTS

### 1. THE PRC PARTY CONGRESS:

#### A. EARLY SOVIET REACTION

SOVIET FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY AND ACADEMIC CHINA SPECIALISTS AGREE THAT CHOU HAS EMERGED IN CONTROL. AN ACADEMICIAN WITH CLOSE TIES TO THE SOVIET PARTY BUREAUCRACY SAID THE KREMLIN CONTINUES TO REGARD CHOU AS A PRAGMATIC LEADER AND IMPLIED THEY WOULD PREFER HIM TO AN UNKNOWN QUANTITY. THERE WAS STRONG INTEREST IN WHO WOULD BE NAMED SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PARTY. THE SPECIALISTS' PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS WAS THAT THE ANTI-SOVIET ASPECTS OF THE CONGRESS WERE AT THE LOWER END OF THE SPECTRUM THAN COULD BE ANTICIPATED  
SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 175025

GIVEN THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. (CONFIDENTIAL)

MOSCOW 10426, 8/31.

#### B. ASSESSMENT OF NEW POLITBURO

-

CONSULATE GENERAL HONG KONG POINTS OUT THAT THE NEW COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP OF FIVE PARTY VICE CHAIRMEN HAS

REMOVED CHOU FROM HIS EXPOSED POSITION A LA LIN, WHILE LEAVING HIM CLEARLY PRIMUS INTER PARES. THE NEW 21-MEMBER POLITBURO CUT BACK SHARPLY ON MILITARY AND CULTURAL REVOLUTION EXTREMIST REPRESENTATION. THE CONSULATE PREDICTS THAT SHANGHAI CHIEF CHANG CHUN-CHIAO, WHILE NOT AMONG THE VICE CHAIRMEN, WILL EMERGE AS THE PARTY'S SECRETARY GENERAL, A POWERFUL POSITION IN THE PAST. (CONFIDENTIAL) HONG KONG 8729, 8/31.

#### C. NEW NUMBER THREE WANG: YOUTH TOKENISM

USLO PEKING BELIEVES THAT WANG HUNG-WEN, THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY'S NEW NUMBER THREE, WAS PICKED FOR HIS YOUTH, GENERAL ACCEPTABILITY, AND COMPETENCE. MAO AND CHOU, USLO NOTES, ARE AWARE OF THE NEED FOR YOUNG BLOOD IN THE PARTY'S UPPER REACHES, AND WANG'S ELEVATION SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE YOUNGER GENERATION WHOSE HOPES WERE SQUASHED BY LIFE'S HARD REALITIES IN THE COUNTRYSIDE FOLLOWING THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION. (CONFIDENTIAL) PEKING 966, 8/31.

#### 2. PEKING AND THE SUBCONTINENT

CONSULATE GENERAL HONG KONG SPECULATES THAT PAKISTANI MINISTER OF STATE AZIZ AHMED'S ARRIVAL IN PEKING MAY PRESAGE THE DEVELOPMENT OF A JOINT PRC-PAKISTAN POLICY ON FURTHER NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND BANGLADESH FOLLOWING THE AUGUST 28 AGREEMENT. WHILE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN WOULD SEEM TO FULFILL THE PRC'S CONDITIONS FOR NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH INDIA (I.E., RAISING REPRESENTATION TO THE AMBASSADORIAL SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 175025

LEVEL, RECOGNIZING BANGLADESH, AND SUPPORTING ITS UN ADMISSION), THE ULTIMATE DISPOSITION OF THE REMAINING 195 PAKISTANI POW'S AND FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT ARE FACTORS THE TWO SIDES WILL PROBABLY CONSIDER CLOSELY DURING THE VISIT. (CONFIDENTIAL) HONG KONG 8763, 8/31.

#### 3. PHNOM PENH: PESSIMISTIC PARTING PROSPECTIVE

IN HIS VALEDICTORY FROM PHNOM PENH, AMBASSADOR SWANK PAINTS A PESSIMISTIC PICTURE OF CAMBODIA, WITH THE KHMER PEOPLE IN THEIR NATURAL INDOLENCE MORE ATTUNED TO A PROTECTIVE RELATIONSHIP, AS EARLIER WITH FRANCE, NOW OURSELVES. THE PROTECTING POWER PROVIDES A POINT OF MEDIATION FOR PETTY INTERNAL POLITICAL DISPUTES WHICH PLAGUE

THE GKR'S WEAK LEADERS. AMBASSADOR SWANK CAN SUGGEST NO BETTER CANDIDATE THAN PRINCE SIHANOUK TO SOLVE THE PUZZLE,

BUT NOTES THAT HE MUST MOVE TOWARDS CENTER AND ADOPT A MORE CONCILIATORY ATTITUDE. HE CAUTIONS AGAINST THE FACILE ASSUMPTION THAT LON NOL'S EARLY REMOVAL COULD PAVE THE WAY TO A SETTLEMENT. IT IS HARD TO SEE WHO WOULD HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO TAKE OVER. (SECRET) PHNOM PENH 9170, 8/31 (EXDIS).

4. FRANCE SEEKS NEW EC ALLY?

EMBASSY PARIS COMMENTS THAT PRESIDENT POMPIDOU'S REFERENCE TO POSSIBLE SPANISH COMMON MARKET ENTRY AT THE CABINET MEETING AUGUST 30 (FOLLOWING FOREIGN MINISTER JOBERT'S MADRID VISIT) MAY REFLECT A FRENCH DESIRE TO FIND A SUITABLE LATIN COUNTERWEIGHT TO GROWING ANGLO-SAXON INFLUENCE FOLLOWING THE EC'S ENLARGEMENT FROM SIX TO NINE. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE) PARIS 23195, 8/31.

5. REYKJAVIK: FISHERIES FRUSTRATION

NATO INTERNATIONAL STAFF SOURCES TOLD USNATO THAT ICELANDIC PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TOMASSON INFORMED SYG LUNS LAST WEEK THAT HE WAS ABOUT TO BE RECALLED IN PRO-SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 175025

TEST OVER NATO'S FAILURE TO HALT BRITISH AGGRESSION IN THE FISHERIES DISPUTE. LUNS SENT AN URGENT PERSONAL MESSAGE TO DOUGLAS-HOME PROPOSING UK WITHDRAWAL IN EXCHANGE FOR ICELANDIC WILLINGNESS TO HOLD BILATERAL TALKS LEADING TO SETTLEMENT IN ONE WEEK. THE SOURCES SAY THE BRITISH REPLY WAS ENTIRELY NEGATIVE, AND THEY HAVE LITTLE DOUBT TOMASSON WILL BE RECALLED. (CONFIDENTIAL) USNATO 4090, 8/31 (LIMDIS).

IN REYKJAVIK, A FOREIGN AFFAIRS MINISTRY OFFICIAL TOLD AMBASSADOR IRVING THAT TOMASSON WAS BEING INSTRUCTED YES-TERDAY TO ADVISE NATO TO REQUEST THE UK TERMINATE ITS MARITIME PATROL FLIGHTS IN THE VICINITY OF ICELAND. THE OFFICIAL MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE PRIME MINISTER IN HIS PRESENT MOOD WOULD NOT HESITATE TO EXTEND ICELAND'S TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY TO FIFTY MILES IF THE FLIGHTS DO NOT CEASE IMMEDIATELY. (SECRET) REYKJAVIK 1013, 8/31.

6. MORE ON ISRAELI CREEPING ANNEXATION

A. A CONFIDANT OF DEFENSE MINISTER DAYAN TOLD EMBASSY TEL AVIV THAT IN DAYAN'S THINKING, REFUGEE REHABILITATION AND AREA DEVELOPMENT IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES SHOULD FACILITATE THE START OF LOCAL POLI-

TICAL AUTONOMY. DAYAN WANTS THE CREATION OF FOUR SUCH

AUTONOMOUS REGIONS IN THE NEXT FOUR YEARS, EACH TO BE GOVERNED IN SOME MEASURE BY ITS OWN ELECTED COUNCIL. HIS FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE IS THE INTERTWINING OF THE DESTINIES OF ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIAN ARABS, A GOAL WHICH THE EMBASSY EARLIER COMMENTED WAS COMMENDABLE, BUT GENERATIONS AWAY IF ATTAINABLE AT ALL. (SECRET) TEL AVIV 6817, 8/30 (EXDIS).

B. RIGHTWING ALIGNMENT TALKS AT IMPASSE

THE INITIATIVE OF FORMER GENERAL SHARON TO CREATE A NEW RIGHTWING POLITICAL ALIGNMENT BEFORE THIS FALL'S KNESSET ELECTIONS REACHED A SERIOUS IMPASSE WHEN THE GAHAL PARTY EXECUTIVE VOTED TO REJECT SHARON'S OFFER OF PARTY REPRESENTATION ON A JOINT LIST. WHILE THERE MAY BE FURTHER EFFORTS, OUR EMBASSY BELIEVES THE OUTLOOK APPEARS BLEAK. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY BEING AUTHORITATIVELY MOOTED IS THAT THE THREE PARTIES MAY GO TO ELECTIONS SEPARATELY AND DECIDE ON A KNESSET ALIGNMENT AFTERWARDS. (UNCLASSIFIED) SECRET

PAGE 05 STATE 175025

SENTATION ON A JOINT LIST. WHILE THERE MAY BE FURTHER EFFORTS, OUR EMBASSY BELIEVES THE OUTLOOK APPEARS BLEAK. ANOTHER POSSIBILITY BEING AUTHORITATIVELY MOOTED IS THAT THE THREE PARTIES MAY GO TO ELECTIONS SEPARATELY AND DECIDE ON A KNESSET ALIGNMENT AFTERWARDS. (UNCLASSIFIED) TEL AVIV 6890, 8/31.

7. CAIRO RATIOCINATIONS ON US MIDDLE EAST POLICY

CHARGE WILEY POSTULATES THAT EGYPTIAN OFFICIALS SEEM TO HAVE ARRIVED AT THE FOLLOWING THEORY OF US MIDDLE EAST POLICY: WE ARM THE IRANIANS TO PROTECT OUR OIL INTERESTS IN THE PERSIAN GULF WHILE ARMING ISRAEL TO KEEP ITS BOOT ON EGYPT'S NECK. THEY CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THE US COULD PUT PRESSURE ON ISRAEL IF WE WERE REALLY INTERESTED IN A SETTLEMENT. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY SUCH MOVES ON OUR PART, CAIRO WILL PROBABLY REACT BY INTENSIFYING ITS EFFORT TO LASH OUT AGAINST US INTERESTS, NOTABLY BY SOLICITING SAUDI AND GULF SUPPORT FOR PRESURE ON OUR OIL INTERESTS. (SECRET) USINT CAIRO 2625, 8/31 (EXDIS). ROGERS

SECRET

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** Z  
**Capture Date:** 10 MAY 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** POLITICAL SUMMARIES  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 01 SEP 1973  
**Decaption Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** golinofr  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1973STATE175025  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** S/S-O: WORREL  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** P750014-1176  
**From:** STATE  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1973/newtext/t19730963/abqceilj.tel  
**Line Count:** 206  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM  
**Office:** ORIGIN SS  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** ONLY  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** ONLY  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** golinofr  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 24 JUL 2001  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <24-Jul-2001 by shawdg>; APPROVED <26 FEB 2002 by golinofr>  
**Review Markings:**

Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
30 JUN 2005

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MORNING SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT REPORTS  
**TAGS:** PFOR, XX  
**To:** JCS SECDEF  
CIA  
WHITE HOUSE  
**Type:** TE  
**Markings:** Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005